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FOREWORD 
This  C o l l a b o r a t i v e  Paper i s  one of a series embodying t h e  
outcome of a workshop and conference  on Economic S t r u c t u r a l  
Change: A n a l y t i c a l  I s s u e s ,  he ld  a t  IIASA i n  J u l y  and August 
1983 .  The conference  and workshop formed p a r t  of t h e  con- 
t i n u i n g  IIASA program on P a t t e r n s  of Economic S t r u c t u r a l  Change 
and I n d u s t r i a l  Adjustment. 
S t r u c t u r a l  change was i n t e r p r e t e d  ve ry  broadly :  t h e  t o p i c s  
covered inc luded  t h e  n a t u r e  and causes  of changes i n  d i f f e r e n t  
s e c t o r s  of t h e  world economy, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  markets and n a t i o n a l  economies, and i s s u e s  of organi -  
z a t i o n  and i n c e n t i v e s  i n  l a r g e  economic systems. 
There i s  a g e n e r a l  consensus t h a t  impor tan t  economic 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes a r e  occur r ing  i n  t h e  world economy. There 
a r e ,  however, s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches t o  measuring t h e s e  
changes,  t o  modeling t h e  p rocess ,  and t o  d e v i s i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e  
responses  i n  t e r m s  of p o l i c y  measures and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  re- 
des ign .  Other i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  concern t h e  r o l e  of t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic system i n  t r a n s m i t t i n g  such changes,  and 
t h e  merits of a l t e r n a t i v e  modes of economic o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  
responding t o  s t r u c t u r a l  change. A l l  of t h e s e  i s s u e s  were 
addressed  by p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  workshop and conference ,  and 
w i l l  be t h e  focus  of t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of t h e  r e s e a r c h  program's  
work. 
Geoffrey Heal 
Ana to l i  Smyshlyaev 
Ern6 Z a l a i  

VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN UTILITIES 
AND CARDINAL PREFERENCES* 
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Abstract 
We study the aggregation of preferences when intensities are taken into 
account: the aggregation of cardinal preferences and also of von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utilities for cases of choice under uncertainty. We show that 
with a finite number of choices, there exist no continuous anonymous aggre- 
gation rules that respect unanimity for such preferences or utilities. With 
infinitely many (discrete sets of) choices, such rules do exist and they are 
constructed here. However, their existence is not robust: each is a limit 
of rules that do not respect unanimity. Both results are for economies with 
a finite number of individuals. 
The results are obtained by studying the global topological structure 
of spaces of cardinal preferences and of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. 
with- a finite number of choices, these spaces are proven-to be noncontract- 
ible. With infinitely many choices, on the other hand, they are proven to 
-
be contractible. 
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1. In t roduct ion  
The aggregat ion o f  preferences  s tud ied  i n  s o c i a l  choice theory t y p i c a l l y  
descr ibes  an ind iv idua l  preference a s  a  ranking among choices,  i . e . ,  i n  o r d i n a l  
terms. In most of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  fol lowing Arrow's and Black 's  p ieces  [l] [3], 
i n t e n s i t i e s  of  preferences  a r e  not recorded; i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  it  i s  not poss ib l e  t o  
express whether a  choice x i s  p re fe r r ed  t o  another y more than t o  a  t h i r d ,  z .  
Since most of  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  aggregat ion of  o rd ina l  preferences  a r e  negat ive ,  
it seems na tu ra l  t o  inqu i re  whether more p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  can be obtained when 
t h i s  property is re laxed  and i n t e n s i t i e s  o f  preferences  a r e  recorded. 
A s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p  i n  al lowing t h e  cons idera t ion  of  preference  i n t e n s i t i e s  
is introduced with ca rd ina l  preferences .  These preferences  express p r e c i s e l y  
t h e  not ion t h a t  a  choice x i s  p re fe r r ed  t o  another  y more than t o  a  t h i r d  z .  
In the  case  of  choice under unce r t a in ty ,  t hese  preferences  can be shown t o  have 
t h e  same mathematical s t r u c t u r e  a s  von Neumann-Morgenstern u t i l i t i e s ,  t h e  
numerical r ep resen ta t ions  of  preferences  over  l o t t e r i e s :  These u t i l i t i e s  a r e  
denoted NM u t i l i t i e s ,  and a r e  f r equen t ly  used i n  t h e  opera t ions  research  
l i t e r a t u r e  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of  dec i s ion  theory s i n c e  t h e  concept was developed by 
van kumann and Morgenstern (19); NM u t i l i t i e s  a re  a l s o  widely used as  a  
r ep resen ta t ion  of i nd iv idua l  behavior i n  game t h e o r e t i c  models, see Fishburn (13 ) .  
The main d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  of o rd ina l  and ca rd ina l  preferences  
is t h e  invar iance  they r e q u i r e  from a numerical r ep resen ta t ion .  Cardinal 
preferences r equ i re  much weaker invar iance  than o rd ina l  preferences :  t h e  
r ep resen ta t ion  of ca rd ina l  preference  by a  numerical funct ion  i s  i nva r i an t  
under (and only under) p o s i t i v e  l i n e a r  t ransformat ions .  For o rd ina l  preferences ,  
1 i n s t ead ,  t he  r ep resen ta t ion  must be inva r i an t  under any p o s i t i v e  t ransformation.  
-
The weaker t h e  invar iance ,  the  c l o s e r  a r e  preferences  t o  numerical 
u t i l i t i e s ,  and numerical u t i l i t i e s  have no problem of aggregat ion.  Therefore 
one may expect t h a t  t h e  t a s k  of aggregat ing i s  made e a s i e r  wi th  ca rd ina l  r a t h e r  
than o rd ina l  preferences .  However, t h i s  i s  not  t h e  case .  It was shown i n  
Chichi lnisky [ 4 ]  and i n  Chichi lnisky and Heal [ 8 ]  t h a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  element i n  
our a b i l i t y  t o  aggregate preferences  i s  t h e  g lobal  t opo log ica l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
space of preferences  considered.  I n  order  t o  admit appropr i a t e  aggregat ion 
r u l e s ,  t hese  spaces must be c o n t r a c t i b l e ,  i . e .  t opo log ica l ly  t r i v i a l .  However, 
t h e  topologica l  s t r u c t u r e  of spaces of preferences  may be complex even when 
l e s s  invar iance  i s  requi red .  For in s t ance ,  NM u t i l i t i e s  wi th  f i n i t e  l o t t e r i e s  
a r e  shown here t o  d e f i n e  a  non-cont rac t ib le  space,  i . e .  a  space wi th  a  non- 
t r i v i a l  topologica l  s t r u c t u r e  ( see  Sec t ion  2 ) .  
By i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the  g loba l  topology of spaces of ca rd ina l  preferences  
and of NM u t i l i t i e s ,  we prove he re  t h a t  wi th  f i n i t e l y  many choices ,  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  no continuous anonymous s o c i a l  aggregat ion r u l e  t h a t  r e spec t s  unanimity. 2 
Aggregation i s  impossible  f o r  ca rd ina l  preferences  and f o r  NM u t i l i t i e s .  
With i n f i n i t e l y  many choices we show ins t ead  t h a t  such aggregat ion r u l e s  
do e x i s t .  However, t h e i r  ex i s t ence  i s  not  robus t  i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  they a r e  
-
t h e  l i m i t  of r u l e s  defined on subse t s  of f i n i t e l y  many choices ,  which do n o t  
r e spec t  unanimity. The same r e s u l t s  apply t o  von Neumann-Morgenstern u t i l i t i e s  
defined over i n f i n i t e l y  many l o t t e r i e s .  A f i n i t e  number of i nd iv idua l s  is  
considered throughout t h e  paper.  
The r e s t  of t he  paper i s  organized a s  fol lows:  Sec t ion  2 gives  n o t a t i o n  
and d e f i n i t i o n s ;  Sec t ion  3 d iscusses  previous l i t e r a t u r e ;  and Sect ion  4 
gives  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
2. Notation and Def in i t i ons  
I n  t h e  case  of f i n i t e  choices t h e  choice space X i s  a f i n i t e  s e t  of 
po in t s  i n  Euclidean space 
x = ( x i I ,  i . 1 ,  ..., n, n a 3 .  
A p r e f e r e n c e  w i t h  i n t e n s i t y  o r  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e  p  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  
n  
w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  v e c t o r  i n  R , 
pn) 
P i  denotes  t h e  u t i l i t y  v a l u e  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  cho ice  x . The t o t a l  i n d i f f e r -  i 
ence p r e f e r e n c e  i s  t h u s  t h e  v e c t o r  wi th  a l l  c o o r d i n a t e s  e q u a l .  Our space  of 
p r e f e r e n c e s  c o n t a i n s  t h i s  t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e  p r e f e r e n c e  a s  w e l l .  
The f o l l o w i n g  s t e p  i s  t o  normal ize  u t i l i t y  v e c t o r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  
a  unique r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  each  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e  by a  v e c t o r  i n  Euc l idean  
space .  T h i s  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  is a  s t a n d a r d  one ;  s e e ,  e . g . ,  K a l a i  and Schmeidler  
[ I51  ; i t s  economic c o n t e n t  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  the  fo l lowing  s e c t i o n .  For- 
n  
m a l l y ,  i f  p = (p l , . .  . ) i s  a  u t i l i t y  v e c t o r  i n  R , p  i s  normal ized  by sub- 
, 
t r a c t i n g  from i t s  c o o r d i n a t e s  t h e  v e c t o r  wi th  a l l  components i d e n t i c a l  t o  
t h e  minimum u t i l i t y  v a l u e  
where m = min {pi) ,  
i 
and then d i v i d i n g  t h e  outcome by i t s  maximum component M i f  H # 0 ,  i . e . ,  
where M = max {pi - m). The t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e  p r e f e r e n c e  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  
i 
t h e r e f o r e  w i t h  the  v e c t o r  ( 0 ,  . . . , 0)  . The f a c t  t h a t  a l l  normal ized p r e f e r -  
ences  have t h e  same minimum and maximum u t i l i t y  v a l u e s  can be cons idered  a  
3 
weak form of i n t e r p e r s o n a l  comparison.  
I t  f o l l o w s  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  wi th  f i n i t e l y  many cho ices  the  s p a c e  of c a r d i n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  P = Q U { o ) ,  where Q i s  t h e  subspace of non-zero c a r d i n a l  p r e f -  
e r e n c e s ,  
Q = { ~ E R ~ ' :  2 pi ~n - 1, p j  r 0 and pk = 1 f o r s o m e  k , j  ~ ( 1 ,  ..., n}},  
i=l 
and {O) denotes  the  t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e  preference .  I n  o r d e r  t o  de f ine  con- 
t i n u i t y  of the s o c i a l  choice r u l e ,  P i s  given the  n a t u r a l  topology i t  i nhe r -  
n The space P has  two connected components, Q and {O) . 4 i t s  from R . 
w 
W e  s h a l l  now d e f i n e  the  space of c a r d i n a l  p re fe rences  P f o r  t he  case of 
i n f i n i t e l y  many choices .  
Assume now t h a t  the choice space X i s  N ,  t he  s e t  of i n t e g e r s .  A 
p re fe rence  p i s  assumed to  be a non-negative sequence of numbers, i . e . ,  a 
non-negative r e a l  valued func t ion  on N .  Since we a r e  concerned wi th  
bounded sequences,  wi thout  l o s s  of g e n e r a l i t y ,  we may assume t h a t  
&P (n> p(n) < 
f o r  some f i n i t e  measure p o r  N given by a dens i ty  func t ion  p(n) . 
w 
The space of p r e f e r ences  P i s  t h e r e f o r e  s t r i c t l y  contained i n  t he  space 
of a l l  bounded sequences,  and t h i s  i s  i n  t u r n  a subse t  ( t h e  p o s i t i v e  cone) of a 
00 
weighted P 1  space.5 Note t h a t  we could have embedded P i n t o  f a ,  t he  space  of 
a l l  bounded sequences wi th  t h e  sup norm, 11 x H w  = sup lxnl . However, t h e  space 
i = 1 , 2 . .  . 
f a i s  a dense subspace of f  wi th  t h e  ( f i n i t e )  weight p ( n ) .  Therefore ,  i f  one 1 
de f ines  an aggrega t ion  map @ f o r  P l y  one has au toma t i ca l l y  def ined  an aggrega t ion  
map f o r  f a ,  given by t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  of @ on f w  considered a s  a subspace of !2 1 ' 
The topology induced by P 1  i s  d i f f e r e n t  than t h e  sup norm on P a ,  but  s i n c e  our 
aim i s  t o  prove an ex i s t ence  theorem, f o r  some adequate  topology,  t h i s  procedure 
-
w 
seems adequate.  I n  any ca se ,  P i s  a s t r i c t  subse t  of fa, a s  wel l  a s  of P I ,  
and i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  s m a l l e r  t h a n  e i t h e r  f a  o r  f l .  T h e r e f o r e ,  n e i t h e r  f w  nor  
00 
f 1  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  p  and t h u s  t h e  c h o i c e  of topo logy  i s  b e s t  made on t h e  b a s i s  
of mathemat ical  adequacy. Theorem 2 shows t h a t  f 1  i s  an  adequa te  space ;  t h e  
spacesf o r  more g e n e r a l l y  f ( w i t h  15 p $00) have been used p r e v i o u s l y  i n  t h e  
P 
economic l i t e r a t u r e ;  s e e  e . g .  C h i c h i l n i s k y  [ 6 ] .  
A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of f i n i t e l y  many c h o i c e s ,  we normal ize  t h e  v e c t o r  p  i n  
o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a  un ique  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s .  An e q u i v a l e n c e  
1 2 
r e l a t i o n  'L i s  d e f i n e d  by p  'L p2 i f  and on ly  i f  = a + Bp , 
a E f l ,  B E R+. A p r e f e r e n c e  i s  an  e q u i v a l e n c e  c l a s s  of p o s i t i v e  v e c t o r s  p  
under t h e  r e l a t i o n  'L. A s p a c e  which i s  i n  a  one t o  one  cor respondence  w i t h  t h e  
s p a c e  of p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  o b t a i n e d  by c o n s i d e r i n g  a l l  v e c t o r s  w i t h  c o o r d i n a t e s  
s m a l l e r  t h a n  1, w i t h  a t  l e a s t  one c o o r d i n a t e  z e r o ,  and w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  non- 
z e r o  c o o r d i n a t e  ( i f  i t  e x i s t s )  e q u a l  t o  1. T h e r e f o r e  w i t h  many c h o i c e s  t h e  
00 00 + 
s p a c e  of c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  P = Q W O } ,  where' Q~ = { f  E f  : f o r  a l l  i, 
00 
f i  .$ 1; f = 0 and f .  + 1 = 1 f o r  some j 1. P i n h e r i t s  t h e  topology of f 1  j J 
00 
and i s  a c l o s e d  s u b s e t  of a  Banach space .  A s  P ,  P c o n s i s t s  of e x a c t l y  two 
connected components. 
Assume now t h e r e  a r e  k  a g e n t s ,  k  2 2 .  With f i n i t e  c h o i c e s  a  p r o f i l e  
1 
of  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  a  v e c t o r  {p , . . . , k k  p  )EP , t h e  c a r t e s i a n  p r o d u c t  
of p  w i t h  i t s e l f  k-t imes r e p e c t i v e l y .  With i n f i n i t e  c h o i c e s  a p r o f i l e  
1 m k  i s  a  v e c t o r  { P  , . . . , p k ~  E (P ) . 
A  r u l e  I$ is  s a i d  t o  r e s p e c t  unanimity  when @ ( p ,  . . . , p) = p ;  i . e .  , 
i f  a l l  v o t e r s  have i d e n t i c a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  dl c h o i c e s ,  s o  does t h e  s o c i a l  
p r e f e r e n c e .  
6 
A  r u l e  I$ i s  anonymous when t h e  outcome i s  independen t  of  t h e  o r d e r  o f  
t h e  v o t e r s ,  i . e . ,  
where 
is any permuta t ion  of  t h e  set { l  , . . . , k )  . 
C o n t i n u i t y  of  a  r u l e  is d e f i n e d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  u s u a l  p roduc t  t o p o l o g i e s  
nk k  
of t h e  s p a c e s  of p r e f e r e n c e s  a s  s u b s e t s  of R o r  (el)  i n  t h e  f i n i t e  and 
i n f i n i t e  c h o i c e  c a s e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y  . 
We now d i s c u s s  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  t o p o l o g i c a l  concep t s  used i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  
A t o p o l o g i c a l  space  X i s  c o n t r a c t i b l e  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  con t inuous  
map f  : X x  [ 0 ,  1 1  + X such t h a t  f ( x ,  0) = x  Yx i n  X ,  and f ( x ,  1) = x f o r  0  ' 
some x  EX. I n t u i t i v e l y ,  X i s  c o n t r a c t i b l e  i f  i t  can be deformed c o n t i n u o u s l y  0  
through i t s e l f ,  i n t o  one o f  i t s  p o i n t s ,  xO. C l e a r l y  e u c l i d e a n  s p a c e  and any 
convex s e t  a r e  c o n t r a c t i b l e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  space  of  con t inuous  r e a l  
va lued  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  is  a  c o n t r a c t i b l e  space .  T o p o l o g i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h e s e  a r e  a l l  t r i v i a l  s p a c e s ,  s i n c e  they a r e  t o p o l o g i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  ( i . e . ,  
con t inuous ly  deformable i n t o )  p o i n t s .  A hollow sphere  i n  R'I i s  n o t  con t rac -  
t i b l e .  As w e  s h a l l  prove below, n e i t h e r  t h e  non t r i v a l  connected component 
t h e  space  of c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r ences  Q,nor  t h a t  of von Neumann-Morgenstern u t i l i t i e s ,  
a r e  c o n t r a c t i b l e .  Th i s  proves t o  be impor tan t  f o r  t h e  agg rega t i on  r e s u l t s  of 
t h i s  paper .  
Re l a t i onsh ip  w i th  Prev ious  Work 
Before  proving t h e  r e s u l t s ,  i t  may be u s e f u l  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  o f  t he  spaces  of p r e f e r ences  s t u d i e d  h e r e  w i th  e a r l i e r  concepts  of c a r -  
d i n a l  p r e f e r ences  used i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and a l s o  e a r l i e r  r e s u l t s  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  
The space  of non ze ro  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  Q corresponds t o  t h e  space  
of c a r d i n a l  u t i l i t i e s  as s t u d i e d  f o r  i n s t a n c e  by K a l a i  and Schmeidler  i1.51: 
2 
two v e c t o r s  and p  d e f i n e  t h e  same c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r ence  when t h e r e  e x i s t  
a  p o s i t i v e  number f3 and a p o s i t i v e  v e c t o r  a such t h a t  
It i s  ea sy  t o  check t h a t  o u r  no rma l i za t i on  of  t h e  p rev ious  s e c t i o n  
i d e n t i f i e s  each  v e c t o r  i n  Q w i th  an  equ iva lence  c l a s s  of v e c t o r s  under t h e  
equ iva lence  r e l a t i o n  
2 
p l z a + b p ,  f o r  all a  > 0, b  > 0 .  
Consider  now the  c a s e  o f  cho ice  under u n c e r t a i n t y .  I n  t h i s  case  t he  
space of von Neumann-Morgenstern u t i l i t i e s ,  i . e . ,  numer ica l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
of p r e f e r ences  over  l o t t e r i e s ,  corresponds p r e c i s e l y  t o  ou r  formal  d e f i n i -  
t i o n  o f  t he  spaces  o f  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r ences .  For f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  s e e ,  e  .g .  , 
i 15 j  and [ 1 9 ] .  
The s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of P given he r e  i s  a l s o  r e l a t e d  to  one of t h e  forms 
of r e l a x a t i o n  of t h e  u sua l  o r d i n a l i t y  and comparab i l i ty  assumptions  d i s cus sed  
i n  dtAspremont and Gevers.  T h e i r  cond i t i on  CN of c a r d i n a l i t y  and 
non-comparabil i ty r e q u i r e s  t h a t  i f  u  and u  a r e  two u t i l i t i e s ,  then they 1 2 
d e f i n e  the  same p re f e r ence  whenever 
where j = 1,. . . , R  i s  t h e  i ndex  f o r  the  v o t e r ,  x  denotes  a  c h o i c e ,  and 
where { a * )  and { f i e )  a r e  p o s i t i v e  real numbers. I n  our framework CN means t h a t  f o r  
J J 
1 2 
each  v o t e r  t he  v e c t o r  p  r e p r e s e n t s  t he  same p r e f e r ence  as ano the r  p  when 
1 t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  v e c t o r  a and a  p o s i t i v e  number B such t h a t  p  = a + Bp 2 .  Thi s  i s  
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  above: 
2 2 
Let  and p  s a t i s f y  p1 = a + Op . Then they y i e l d  t h e  same element  
i n  P,  s i n c e  f o r  any p  = ( p  l , . . . ,  p n ) ,  and any j = l , . . . , n  
a + 8p - min ( a  + hi) j 
Max [ a  + O(pi) - min ( a  + 3pR1 
i R 
1 2 Conversely ,  i f  two u t i l i t y  v e c t o r s  p  and p  i n  R~ y i e l d  t he  same element  i n  
the  space  of i - p r e f e r ences  P,  
then I - 1 1 1 - 2 2 Max (pi - min (pe ) )  Max (pi  - min (p i ) )  
i R i R 
which imp l i e s  t h a t  
I (min (p:)) m x  (pi  - min (P 
i j 
i 2  Max (p2  - m i n  ( p . ) )  i J 
I Max (pi  - min ( p i )  
A. 
and 6 = -, J ?, L L Max (pi - ( P . ) )  
i j J 
Therefore  s o c i a l  cho ice  r u l e s  t h a t  a r e  i n v a r i a n t  under t h e  no rma l i za t i on  of  
P correspond p r e c i s e l y  t o  those  s a t i s f y i n g  c o n d i t i o n  CN.  
S e v e r a l  a u t h o r s  t h a t  s t u d i e d  t he  problems invo lved  i n  agg rega t i ng  
c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  e .  g. , Sen [16 ]  and K a l a i  and Schmeidler [15 1 . It h a s  
been shown [15 ]  t h a t  Arrow-like paradoxes  nay e x i s t  even w i t h  c a r d i n a l  p re -  
f e r e n c e s ,  provided Arrow-like cond i t i ons  a r e  r e q u i r e d  of the  agg rega t i on  pro- 
cedure : t h e s e  a r e  t h e  somewhat c o n t r o v e r s i a l  independence of i r r e l e v a n t  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  Pa r e to  and non d i c t a t o r s h i p .  Such c o n d i t i o n s  may be too s t r o n g .  
Also, whi le  making the  problem amenable t o  a  combina tor ia l  a n a l y s i s ,  such c o n d i t i o n s  
tend to  l e a v e  o u t  i t s  i n t r i n s i c  geometry. Here ,  i n s t e a d ,  o t h e r  cond i t i ons  
of t h e  agg rega t i on  r u l e  a r e  s t u d i e d :  c o n t i n u i t y ,  anonymity and r e s p e c t  of 
unanimity .  These c o n d i t i o n s  admit a  ready geome t r i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  and 
fu r thermore  h e l p  t o  e x h i b i t  t he  t o p o l o g i c a l  n a t u r e  of t h e  problem a t  hand. 
The fo l lowing  r e s u l t  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of agg rega t i on  w i th  
f i n i t e l y  many cho ices .  The space  of p r e f e r ences  i s  t h e r e f o r e  P  = Q u {O}, 
as d e f i n e d  above. 
Theorem 1 
There e x i s t s  no con t inuous  agg reqa t i on  r u l e  f o r  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  
where i n d i v i d u a l  and s o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  may b e  i n d i f f e r e n t  among a l l  cho i ce s .  
P roof :  
k An a gg r ega t i on  r u l e  f o r  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r ences  i s  a map @ : P + P. 
Now, as d i s cus sed  i n  s e c t i o n  2 ,  t h e  space  P  ha s  e x a c t l y  two connected com- 
ponents ,  Q and {o} ( f i g u r e  1 below i l l u s t r a t e s  the  case  of t h r e e  c h o i c e s ) .  
There fore  the  p r oduc t  space pk has  e x a c t l y  2k connected components. 
The map $ is  t h e r e f o r e  a  cont inuous f u n c t i o n  from a t o p o l o g i c a l  space  
k 
with  2  components i n t o  ano t he r  w i th  2  components. I t  fo l lows  from cont inu-  
i t y  of  $ t h a t  each  of t he  connected components of  pk must be mapped by @ i n t o  
';he space of preferences P w i t h  three  choices is indicated as f i e  union 
of the point  (0) with +-he s e t  drawn with a heavy l ine .  The non zero 
connected component of PI  in indicated with the heavy l ine) is cn a one 
t o  cne bicontinuous correspondsnce with the boundary aS of the  simplex 
S i n  Ft3, and is therefore  not contract ible  in R ~ .  
k 
one connected component of  P .  Consider  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  Q , which i s  t h e  con- 
k 
nec t ed  component of  P c o n s i s t i n g  of  a l l  non ze ro  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r ences .  Then 
k 
e i t h e r  $(Q ) C Q, o r  else $(Q~) C {O}.  However, by t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of r e s p e c t  
k 
of  unanimity p , . .  . p = p f o r  a l l  p  i n  Q, implying t h a t  $(Q ) $ {0}, i . e . ,  
$(Q~) C Q. 
The re fo r e ,  t h e  axioms o f  c o n t i n u i t y  and t h a t  of r e s p e c t  of unanimity 
taken t oge the r  r u l e  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a  p r o f i l e  w i t h  all p re f e r ences  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  zero v e c t o r  may be  mapped i n t o  t h e  ze ro  outcome v e c t o r .  There- 
f o r e  , a cont inuous r u l e  f o r  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r ences  which r e s p e c t s  unanimity 
w i l l  only  a s s i g n  the  t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  a  set of v o t e r s  i f  a t  l e a s t  one 
7 
of  them i s  t o t a l l y  i n d i f f e r e n t  among a l l  cho i ce s .  
k $ induces  t h e r e f o r e  a  cont inuous map 7 : Q + Q, which is a l s o  con t inuous ,  
k 
anonymous and r e s p e c t s  unanimity.  S ince  Q and Q a r e  bo th  connected s p a c e s ,  w e  
can now use t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  [ 7 ] .  These results e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  
such a  map $ depends on c e r t a i n  t o p o l o g i c a l  i n v a r i a n t s  of  t h e  space  Q. The n e x t  
s t e p  of t h e  proof c o n s i s t s  t h e r e f o r e  of  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  topology of the  space 
of non zero c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  f o r  any f i n i t e  number of cho ices  n  2 3. 
n-1 Consider  t h e  subspace R of  Rn+, c o n s i s t i n g  of a l l  v e c t o r s  p  w i th  t h e  j 
j - th  coo rd ina t e  p  = 0. The set T . C R ~ - '  de f ined  by j J j 
is an  n-2 dimensional  s implex.  low,  the  set Q = Q r /  Rn-I i s  i n  a  one-to- j j 
one correspondence w i th  T by t h e  map m de f i ned  by j ' 
m 
n 
, s i n c e  p  # !0) f o r  a l l  p  i n  Q. Since  t h e  map m i s  P +  -
c 
i=l 
cont inuous ,  and so  i s  i t s  i n v e r s e ,  i t  fo l lows  t h a t  t h e  space  Q  is  homeo- 
morphic t o  t he  s implex T  . j 
Now, f o r  any j , L E { l ,  . . . ,n} the  i n t e r s e c t i o n  Q .  r )  Q  = T.  f l  TQ.  
n  
J L J  
S ince  Q  = Q  and Q j n Q Q  = T . n T L  f o r  all j and L ,  i t  fo l lows  t h a t  
j =1 j ' J 
() Q j  i s  homeomorphic t o  (31 Tj .  There fore  Q  i s  homeomorphic t o  0 T  
j =1 j =1 j =l j ' 
Now, 0 T2 i s ,  i n  t u r n ,  homeomorphic t o  t he  boundary of an n-dimensional 
s implex i n  R", i. e .  , an n-2 dimensional  sphe re .  I t  fo l lows  t h a t  Q  i s  homeo- 
morphic t o  an n-2 dimensional  sphe re  and ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Q  i s  s t  
c o n t r a c t i b l e .  W e  can now apply  t h e  r e s u l t s  of [ 7 ] ,  which e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  f o r  any 
( p a r a )  f i n i t e  CW complex X ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t i b i l i t y  of  X is a  nece s sa ry  c o n d i t i o n  
k  f o r  t he  e x i s t e n c e  of a  con t inuous  anonymous r u l e  I$ : X + X ,  which r e s p e c t s  
unanimity ,  f o r  a l l  k - > 2. S ince  Q  is  a f i n i t e  CW complex and i s  n o t  con- 
t r a c  t i b l e ,  t h i s  completes t h e  p roo f .  
S ince  a s  d i s cus sed  above t h e  space  of  NM u t i l i t i e s  can be i d e n t i f i e d  
w i t h  P i f  t h e r e  a r e  f i n i t e l y  many cho ices  i n  each s t a t e ,  we have t h e r e f o r e  ob t a ined  
from theorem 1: 
C o r o l l a r y  1 
The space  o f  von-Neumann Morgenstern u t i l i t i e s  w i t h  f i n i t e l y  many l o t t e r i e s  
i s  n o t  c o n t r a c t i b l e .  
and 
Coro l l a rv  2 
With f i n i t e l y  many l o t t e r i e s  t h e r e  e x i s t  no con t inuous  anonymous agg rega t i on  
r u l e  f o r  von Neumann-Morqenstern u t i l i t i e s  which r e s p e c t s  unanimity .  Th i s  
i n c l u d e s  c a s e s  where i n d i v i d u a l  and s o c i a l  u t i l i t i e s  may be i n d i f f e r e n t  
among a l l  l o t t e r i e s .  
Remark : Even though o u r  f ranework and c a c d i t i o n s  on the agg rega t i on  r u l e  
a r e  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  from those  of  Ka l a i  and Schmeidler ,  our i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
r e s u l t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e i r s  i n  c a s e s  of f i n i t e l y  many cho i ce s .  
However, t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  case  f o r  i n f i n i t e l y  many cho i ce s .  I n s t e a d ,  
w e  o b t a i n  i n  t he  nex t  s e c t i o n  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  agg rega t i on  r e s u l t  f o r  h i s  l a t t e r  c a s e .  
Th is  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  of  Ka l a i  and Schmeidler  because t h e i r  impossi-  
b i l i t y  r e s u l t  is  v a l i d  a l s o  w i th  i n f i n i t e l y  many cho i ce s .  Th is  i s  because 
they  r e q u i r e  t he  axiom of  independence o f  i r r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  which e f f e c -  
t i v e l y  reduces  t he  problem o f  aggrega t ion  wi th  i n f i n i t e l y  many cho ices  t o  one 
of aggrega t ion  w i th  f i n i t e l y  many cho ices .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two 
r e s u l t s  a r i s e s  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  sets of axioms are r e q u i r e d :  w e  
do n o t  r e q u i r e  independence of i r r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  b u t  r e q u i r e  c o n t i n u i t y  
i n s t e a d ,  and we do n o t  r e q u i r e  t h e  P a r e t o  c o n d i t i o n ,  bu t  r a t h e r  a (weaker) 
cond i t i on  of r e s p e c t  of  unanimity .  The r e s u l t s  g iven  below a l s o  show t h a t  t h e  
aggrega t ion  w i th  i n f i n i t e l y  many cho ices  i s  n o t  r obus t  a s  a l i m i t i n g  p roce s s  
of agg rega t i on  on c e r t a i n  f i n i t e  s u b s e t s  of cho i ce s .  
W e  now t u r n  t o  the  case  of i n f i n i t e l y  many cho i ce s .  Our space  of 
00 
c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  t h e r e f o r e  P . As  be fo re  , t h e r e  a r e  a f i n i t e  number 
of i n d i v i d u a l s  , k  > 2 .  
Theorem 2 
With i n f i n i t e l y  many c h o i c e s ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  cont inuous aqq reqa t i on  
a k  
r u l e  4 : (P ) + pW f o r  c a r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  r e s p e c t i n g  unanimity and anonym- 
i t y  g iven  by a con t inuous  deformat ion of  a  Bergsonian r u l e  i . e . ,  a  convex 
a d d i t i o n  r u l e   
t r a r i l y  l a r g e  f i n i t e  s e t s  of cho i ce s  and which do n o t  r e s p e c t  unanimity;  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  they  a r e  no t  P a r e t o .  
Proof :  
A s  i n  theorem 1, we may cons ide r  a  con t inuous  agg rega t i on  r u l e  
00 
a s s i g n i n g  t o  each p r o f i l e  o f  k ( n o n - t r i v i a l )  p r e f e r e n c e s  i n  P , an  e lement  
00 00 
of P , where P = Q ~ ~ { o ) ,  and 
00 + 
Q =  EL^: Pi - < 1 f o r  a l l  i ,  p j  = 0 and pjtl = 1 f o r  some j } .  
00 
A s  i n  t h e  f i n i t e  dimensional  c a se  one can show t h a t  Q i s  i n  a one t t o -  
one b icon t inuous  correspondence w i th  t h e  boundary of  a d i s k  i n  2  i . e . ,  w i t h  1 ' 
an i n f i n i t e  d imens iona l  s p h e r e  i n  k 1 ' 
Now, by c o r o l l a r y  5 .1 ,  p .  109 of Bessaga and Pe l czynsk i  i 2 ]  and 
00 
Kuiper [14]  t h e  space Q i s  homeomorphic t o  2  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i s  con- 1 ' 
t r a c t i b l e .  This i s  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t he  f i n i t e  dimensional  c a s e ,  where sphe re s  
a r e  not c o n t r a c t i b l e  and indeed  n s  homeomorphic t o  euc l i dean  space.  Le t  H 
be t h e  homeomorphism, H : Q- + Z1. Since  convex a d d i t i o n  C i n  2  e x i s t s  1 
and i t  s a t i s f i e s  anonymity, c o n t i n u i t y  and r e s p e c t  of unanimity ,  t h e  compo- 
-1 k 
s i t i o n  map $ = Ho CoH de f ined  by 
cok  
i s  a cont inuous func t i on  $ : (Q ) + Q~ s a t i s f y i n g  anonymity and r e s p e c t  of 
unanimity .  S ince  we can r e p e a t  t h i s  procedure  f o r  each  connected component 
00k 
of (P ) , t h i s  proves  e x i s t e n c e .  C l e a r l y  t h e  map 4 i s  a deformat ion o f  the  
convex a d d i t i o n  r u l e  C ,  i . e .  , a deformat ion of a Bergsonian r u l e .  
Consider  now the  space  of t r unca t ed  sequences  T C Q ,  
T - {{p) : ?I w i th  pN = O f o r  Z.I,M ) .  0 0 
T hi s  space i s  dense i n  2 w i th  a ( f i n i t e )  measure. Consider  the  po in twise  1 
k 8 
convergence topology of  t h e  space F of cont inuous f u n c t i o n s  F = f  : (L1) + Z1). 
The sequence of r e s t r i c t i o n  maps de f i ned  by t he  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of 4 t o  
f i n i t e  dimensional  l i n e a r  subspaces  L whose dimensions d e f i n e  an unbounded d  
sequence of i n t e g e r s  { d l ,  converges t o  4.  Note t h a t  when r e s t r i c t e d  t o  any 
f i n i t e  subspace of cho ices  ( i . e . ,  when r e s t r i c t e d  t o  v e c t o r s  of  f i n i t e  l e n g t h )  
t h e  map @d remains anonymous. It  fo l lows  by theorem 1 t h a t  4 cannot  r e s p e c t  d  
unanimity on such subspace ; i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  i s  n o t  P a r e t o .  S ince  t h e  
sequence of maps converges t o  t h e  map 4, t h i s  completes t h e  p roof .  
From theorem 2 we o b t a i n  immediately t h e  analogue t o  c o r o l l a r i e s  1 and 2 
f o r  von Neumann-Morgenstern u t i l i t i e s :  
C o r o l l a r v  3 
With i n f i n i t e l y  many l o t t e r i e s ,  t h e  space of  von Neumann-Morgenstern 
m 
u t i l i t i e s  P  i s  c o n t r a c t i b l e .  
and 
Co r o l l a r v  4 
9  
a q g r e q a t i on  r u l e  f o r  von Neumann-Morqenstern u t i l i t v  f u n c t i o n s  which r e q n e c t s  
unanimity .  However, t h i s  r u l e  i s  n o t  r o b u s t  s i n c e  it i s  t h e  Limit  of non-Pareto 
r u l e s  on a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  sets of l o t t e r i e s .  
l ~ h e  problem of agg rega t i on  of o r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of agg rega t i ng  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  ( e . g . ,  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  
Bergsonian s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f unc t i on )  because t h e  agg rega t i on  of o r d i n a l  p r e f -  
e r ences  must be independent  of t h e  cho i ce  of  t h e i r  u t i l i t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  
For i n s t a n c e ,  i f  u  i s  a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  and F i s  a  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  numer- 
i c a l .  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  o r d i n a l  p r e f e r ence  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  u t i l i t y  u  must be 
t he  same a s  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  f u n c t i o n  F o u. T h e r e f o r e ,  a  r u l e  f o r  
agg rega t i ng  u t i l i t i e s  w i l l  o n l y  induce a  r u l e  f o r  agg rega t i ng  o r d i n a l  p r e f e r -  
ences  i f  i t  i s  i n v a r i a n t  under any such i n c r e a s i n g  t r an s fo rma t ion  of u t i l i t i e s .  
Th i s  i s  indeed  a  r a t h e r  s t r o n g  c o n d i t i o n ,  and s e v e r a l  p o s s i b l e  r e l a x a t i o n s  
have been s t u d i e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  by Sen [16] [ 17 ] ,  Hammond [ 1 3 ] ,  K a l a i  and 
Schmeidler [15]  and more r e c e n t l y  by dfAspremont and Gevers [ l o ] .  Sen [17]  
c o n c e n t r a t e s  on t h e  r e l a x a t i o n  of the  assumption of no i n t e r p e r -  
s o n a l  comparisons.  dfAspremont and Gevers d i s c u s s  and c h a r a c t e r i z e  a  wide 
combination of assumptions  t h a t  r e l a x '  both  t h e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  comparison and 
t he  o r d i n a l i t y  assumptions .  Our framework h e r e  i s  most c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
axiom (CN) o f  dfAspremont and Gevers ,  which assumes t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  a r e  c a r d i n a l  and non comparable,  and t o  t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  assumptions  
of Sen [16 ]  and of K a l a i  and Schmeidler .  
Respect o f  unanimity  i s  s t r i c t l y  weaker than  the  P a r e t o  c o n d i t i o n .  
I t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  i f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  ag r ee  unanimously over  a l l  c h o i c e s ,  so  
does t he  aggrega te .  T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  does n o t  imply t h a t  i f  one cho ice  x  i s  
-
p r e f e r r e d  t o  ano the r  y  by a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  then  the  aggrega te  p r e f e r s  x  t o  y .  
This  no rma l i za t i on  h a s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  sum t o t a l  
of i n t e n s i t i e s  over  cho ices  i s  uniformly bounded ove r  a g e n t s ;  t h i s  was a sug- 
g e s t i o n  of L.  Gevers. 
4 A connected component of  a  t o p o l o g i c a l  space Y i s  a  maximum connected 
subspace of Y .  A space X i s  - connected i f  i t  cannot  be decomposed as a union 
X = XI U X 2 ,  whereX # $, X2 # $, and XI and X2 a r e  bo th  open and c lo sed  s e t s .  1 This  ex tends  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  any p o i n t  i n  X can be j o ined  t o  ano the r  i n  X by 
a pa th  con ta ined  i n  X .  
5(!L1,u) i s  t h e  Banach space of i n f i n i t e  sequences  of r e a l  numbers 
{ ~ n I n = l , 2 , .  . such t h a t  
co 
s e e  [ l l ] .  
Note t h a t  t h i s  cond i t i on  i s  binding  on ly  when a l l  v o t e r s  have i d e n t i -  
c a l  p r e f e r ences .  It is  t h e r e f o r e  a  s t r i c t l y  weaker cond i t i on  than P a r e t o ,  
s i n c e  a r u l e  $ s a t i s f i e s  t h e  Pa re to  cond i t i on  i f  whenever a  cho ice  x E X i s  
p r e f e r r e d  t o  ano the r  y  E X f o r  a l l  p r e f e r ences  . . , p k ,  then $I($, .  . . ,pk) 
a l s o  p r e f e r s  x t o  y. 
' I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  v i o l a t i n g  our axioms, r u l e s  t h a t  a s s i g n  zero  outcomes 
t o  non zero  v e c t o r s  a r e  c l e a r l y  undes i r ab l e  f o r  o t h e r  r ea sons :  It i s  easy  t o  
check t h a t  i f  $ is  a cont inuous map from ( R ~ ) ~  i n t o  Rn t h a t  maps a  p r o f i l e  of 
t h r e e  v o t e r s  w i th  non zero v e c t o r s  i n t o  t h e  t r i v i a l  ( z e ro )  s o c i a l  p r e f e r ence ,  
i t  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  map t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  of - some Condorcet t r i p l e  i n t o  t he  
t r i v i a l  outcome (0 ,  ..., 0 ) .  The 'Condorcet t r i p l e '  we a r e  r e f e r r i n g  t o  i s  
ob ta ined  by choosing t h r e e  p a i n t s  (xyz) i n  Rn,  so t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  v e c t o r s  giv-  
i n g  the  v o t e r s '  p r e f e r ences  rank  t h e s e  choices  i n  t he  o r d e r s  (xyz) (zxy) and 
(yzx) r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Such aggrega t ion  would g i v e  a  t r i v i a l  ( t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e )  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  Condorcet t r i p l e ,  which i s  c l e a r l y  n o t  an accep t ab l e  s o l u t i o n .  
8 ~ h e  po in twise  convergence topology r on F i s  de f ined  by t h e  c o ~ e r g e n c e  
r u l e  
- 
s e e  [ I l l .  
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